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FOREWORD—A STUDENT SYMPOSIUM ON NATIONAL 
FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS V. SEBELIUS 
Joshua Silverstein* 
 
In June of 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (“NFIB v. Sebelius”).1  The 
case addressed the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (“Affordable Care Act”),2 which enacted wide-ranging changes to 
the American health care system.  Health care reform is one of the most 
substantively important and politically salient issues in American public life.  
And the legal challenges to the Affordable Care Act implicated fundamental 
aspects of our constitutional structure, including the limits of Federal power, 
the nature of state sovereignty, individual liberty, and interpretive method-
ology.  As a result, NFIB v. Sebelius was the most closely followed Supreme 
Court case since Bush v. Gore.  It captured the imagination of the public and 
inspired an extraordinary amount of commentary in the build up to the deci-
sion.  Given the political and legal importance of the issues addressed in the 
case, the editors of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
and I concluded that NFIB v. Sebelius merits substantial attention in the 
pages of the review. 
In addition to being significant, the constitutional issues that the Su-
preme Court adjudicated in NFIB v. Sebelius are complicated.  And there are 
many such issues.  The case thus does not lend itself to traditional student 
scholarship.  It is simply too long in length and too broad in scope for a sin-
gle student note or comment.3  Accordingly, I proposed that the Law Review 
conduct a written student symposium on NFIB v. Sebelius, with each student 
piece tackling one of the difficult questions raised in the case.4  The editors 
accepted my recommendation, and the results are set forth in this volume of 
the review.  
  
 * Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen School 
of Law.  B.A. 1993, Hamilton College.  J.D. 1996, New York University School of Law. 
 1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of titles 5, 
18, 20, 21, 25, 26, 28–31, 35, 36, and 42 of the United States Code). 
 3. For example, the various opinions in the case took up a total of 112 pages of West’s 
Supreme Court Reporter. The decision runs from page 2566 of volume 132 through page 
2677. 
 4. My thanks to David Schlesinger of Jacobs & Schlesinger LLP, located in San Diego, 
California, for assistance in developing the idea of a student symposium on NFIB v. Sebelius. 
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The symposium starts with “The Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act: A Constitutional Analysis,” by David Jung.  This article serves as 
an introduction to, and background for, the remaining pieces.  Jung begins 
with a political history of health care reform in the United States, covering 
the period from the early twentieth century up through the adoption of the 
Affordable Care Act.  He then presents an overview of the statute.  Next, 
Jung discusses the procedural history of the constitutional challenges to the 
act in the lower courts.  Finally, Jung summarizes the various Supreme 
Court opinions in NFIB v. Sebelius.  He sets forth all of the pertinent rulings 
as well as the arguments of the concurring and dissenting justices. 
The second piece in the symposium, by Josie Richardson, is entitled 
“Let Them Eat . . . Broccoli?”  Richardson analyzes the Supreme Court’s 
ruling that the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act exceeds Con-
gress’s power under the Commerce Clause.  The mandate is a requirement 
that all citizens either purchase health insurance or pay a “penalty.”5  As 
Richardson explains, the Court concluded that the Commerce power extends 
only to the regulation of existing commercial activity.  It does not cover the 
failure to act; Congress may not use the Commerce Clause to regulate mere 
inactivity.  Compelling a person to engage in a commercial transaction, such 
as by mandating that the person buy health insurance, is the regulation of 
inactivity.  Thus, it is beyond the authority conferred by the Commerce 
Clause. 
NFIB v. Sebelius is only the third Supreme Court opinion since the 
New Deal to find that an act of Congress exceeded the limits of the com-
merce power.  That might lead one to conclude that the decision significant-
ly altered Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  But Richardson persuasively 
argues otherwise.  In fact, she concludes that the law “essentially remains 
unchanged.”  Most importantly, Richardson explains that the individual 
mandate is unique.  Congress had never before attempted to force individu-
als to enter into commercial transactions with other private parties.  Finding 
that something so novel is beyond Congress’s commerce power says very 
little about either the vast bulk of legislation on the books or statutes likely 
to be proposed in the future. 
The astute reader will note that I did not describe the Court’s conclu-
sion with respect to the Commerce Clause as a “holding.”  That is because 
there is some dispute as to whether the ruling was necessary to the Court’s 
ultimate judgment that the individual mandate was a valid exercise of Con-
gress’s taxing power.  And that question turns, in part, on whether Chief 
Justice Roberts properly used the canon of constitutional avoidance in his 
opinion for the Court.  This is the topic of the next article in the symposium, 
  
 5. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. V 2012). 
2013] FOREWORD 541 
“Avoiding the Unavoidable: The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance as Ap-
plied to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” by T.J. Fosko. 
The canon of constitutional avoidance provides that courts should in-
terpret a statute in such a way as to avoid raising constitutional questions 
when the language of the statute is susceptible to such a reading.  More spe-
cifically, as between two interpretations of a law, one that makes the law 
constitutional and another that makes it unconstitutional, courts should 
adopt the former unless that understanding is clearly inconsistent with Con-
gressional intent.  In NFIB v. Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts used the canon 
in holding that the payment a person must make if they choose not to buy 
health insurance is a tax rather than a penalty.  He reasoned that if the pay-
ment constitutes a penalty, it is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s 
commerce power; but if the payment is a tax, it is a constitutional exercise 
of Congress’s taxing power.  And so the Chief Justice adopted the latter 
reading. 
The potential problem here is that, under the modern understanding of 
the canon of constitutional avoidance, the canon is about avoiding constitu-
tional questions.  But Chief Justice Roberts did not avoid the constitutional 
question implicating the Commerce Clause; he addressed it in full.  Why?  
According to Fosko, it is because the Chief Justice relied on precedents that 
applied the older, classical version of the canon of constitutional avoid-
ance—a version which requires that the Court resolve the constitutional 
question at issue on the merits.  Moreover, Roberts used those precedents to 
craft a new canon that addresses the unique circumstances of NFIB v. 
Sebelius. 
The Supreme Court struck down only one aspect of the Affordable 
Care Act—the provisions conditioning the states’ existing Medicaid funding 
on their adoption of the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion.  The 
Court held that Congress lacked the power to impose such a condition under 
the Spending Clause of the Constitution.  This is the subject of the final 
piece in the symposium, “Breaking Down the Supreme Court’s Spending 
Clause Ruling in NFIB v. Sebelius: A Huge Blow to the Federal Govern-
ment or a Mere Bump in the Road?” by Ellen Howard. 
Congress may use its spending power to provide incentives for states to 
take certain actions, such as by conditioning the receipt of federal funds.  
But the Constitution prohibits Congress from coercing the states into action 
via spending conditions.  Howard explains that the Sebelius Court adopted a 
new test for determining whether such a condition coerces the states: Con-
gressional action is coercive if it conditions “significant” funding on the 
adoption of an “independent” program.  The Medicaid expansion condition 
met both prongs of the test.  First, the Medicaid funding that Congress pro-
vides to the states under pre-Affordable Care Act law is significant.  Second, 
the Medicaid expansion that the states were required to adopt in order to 
keep their pre-Affordable Care Act funding was a separate, independent 
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program, despite Congress’s use of the label “Medicaid.”  Accordingly, the 
condition was coercive and beyond Congress’s spending power. 
NFIB v. Sebelius is the first time in American history that the Supreme 
Court held that Congress exceeded the powers conferred by the Spending 
Clause.  However, as with the Commerce Clause, the ultimate impact of this 
ruling is likely to be quite small.  Howard forcefully demonstrates that the 
vast majority of Congress’s spending conditions are not coercive under the 
new test.  She establishes this by showing that three important conditional 
spending programs—those enacted by (1) the No Child Left Behind Act, (2) 
the Clean Air Act, and (3) “Megan’s Law”—survive application of the new 
constitutional framework.  What distinguishes the Affordable Care Act is 
the sheer size of Medicaid.  No other Federal spending program has any-
where near the impact on the states that Medicaid does.  In other words, like 
the individual mandate, Medicaid is unique.  Therefore, the constitutional 
infirmity of the Medicaid expansion condition says very little about other 
existing programs or about those Congress is likely adopt down the line. 
The common themes running through the three substantive articles in 
the symposium are this: NFIB v. Sebelius raised issues that are critically 
important on legal and political grounds, but the ultimate holdings and sup-
porting reasoning did not significantly change American constitutional law.  
The Federal Government’s power to regulate under the Commerce and 
Spending Clauses is largely intact.  Striking down the Medicaid condition 
and ruling that the individual mandate exceeds the commerce power are best 
understood as minor adjustments made at the outer boundaries of federal 
authority, not dramatic changes to our constitutional order.  And since most 
legislation is well within the scope of federal power, NFIB v. Sebelius’s 
impact will be rather limited.  Finally, Chief Justice Roberts’s new under-
standing of the constitutional avoidance canon reflects not a radical innova-
tion, but a cautious extension of long-established precedents. 
I would like to thank the authors of the four symposium pieces, their 
faculty advisors, and the editors and board of the University of Arkansas at 
Little Rock Law Review for their work in bringing this written symposium 
to fruition.  I hope that the readers of the Law Review get as much out of the 
four symposium pieces as I did. 
 
